> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://security.navidnaf.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://security.navidnaf.com/side-channel/side-channel-analysis.md).

# Side Channel Analysis

Every encryption has the following basic algorithm in place -

<figure><img src="https://244896893-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2FTy5fNwfsaV6DbqjnheTF%2Fuploads%2FuG1plaKXtes0NLTrD2tE%2Fscheme.png?alt=media&amp;token=edf73588-95c7-49c6-8d77-cf42ec7db6b0" alt=""><figcaption><p>Basic Encryption</p></figcaption></figure>

Although you know the input and output, there is no way to derive the key. In the case of side-channel attacks, something somehow connected to the encryption or key is deduced or leaked, allowing for the recovery of the key. This is a passive attack on a system. Side-channels in embedded systems can include timing, RF, power, acoustic, heat, and other measurable effects. Side-channel attacks involve observation and exploit 'unintended' emissions of information. These side channels can be used to recover secret information from a device.

> Side-channel attacks exploit unintended information leaks from a system's physical implementation or environment during normal operation. They bypass cryptographic defenses by analyzing side-effects like timing, power consumption, or electromagnetic radiation to extract sensitive data such as encryption keys. These attacks are significant in resource-constrained environments like embedded systems and require countermeasures such as masking or noise addition for mitigation.